Progress through the stages happens as a result of the individual's increasing competence,
both psychologically and in balancing conflicting social-value claims. The process
of resolving conflicting claims to reach an equilibrium is called ‘justice operation’.
Kohlberg identifies two of these justice operations:-
- equality which involves an impartial regard for persons
- reciprocity which means a regard for the role of personal merit
For Kohlberg, the most adequate result of both operations is reversibility, in which
a moral or dutiful act within a particular situation is evaluated in terms of whether
or not the act would be satisfactory even if particular persons were to switch roles
within that situation (also known colloquially as ‘moral musical chairs’)
Gerald Berkowitz & Martin Gibbs (1983) support Kohlberg’ attribution of the importance
of cognitive operations, saying that the key to moral progression lies in such ‘transactive
interactions’.
Knowledge and learning contribute to moral development. Specifically important are
the individual's ‘view of persons’ and their ‘social perspective level’, each of
which becomes more complex and mature with each advancing stage. The ‘view of persons
can be understood as the individual's grasp of the psychology of other persons; it
may be pictured as a spectrum, with stage one having no view of other persons at
all, and stage six being entirely sociocentric. Similarly, the ‘social perspective
level’ involves the understanding of the social universe, differing from the view
of persons in that it involves an appreciation of social norms.
It is important to remember that, in analysing the responses to his dilemmas, Kohlberg
focussed on form and structure, allowing that content related to that structure could
vary but still represent that stage of moral development.
For example, responses in the ‘Heinz Dilemma’ ranged like...
Stage1 (obedience): Heinz should not steal the medicine because he will consequently
be put in prison which will mean he is a bad person. Or: Heinz should steal the medicine
because it is only worth $200 and not how much the druggist wanted for it; Heinz
had even offered to pay for it and was not stealing anything else.
Stage 2 (self-interest): Heinz should steal the medicine because he will be much
happier if he saves his wife, even if he will have to serve a prison sentence. Or:
Heinz should not steal the medicine because prison is an awful place, and he would
probably be more miserable being in jail than having his wife die.
Stage 3 (conformity): Heinz should steal the medicine because his wife expects it;
he wants to be a good husband. Or: Heinz should not steal the drug because stealing
is bad and he is not a criminal; he tried to do everything he could without breaking
the law, you cannot blame him.
Stage 4 (law-and-order): Heinz should not steal the medicine because the law prohibits
stealing, making it illegal. Or: Heinz should steal the drug for his wife but also
take the prescribed punishment for the crime as well as paying the druggist what
he is owed. Criminals cannot just run around without regard for the law; actions
have consequences.
Stage 5 (human rights): Heinz should steal the medicine because everyone has a right
to choose life, regardless of the law. Or: Heinz should not steal the medicine because
the scientist has a right to fair compensation. Even if his wife is sick, it does
not make his actions right.
Stage 6 (universal human ethics): Heinz should steal the medicine, because saving
a human life is a more fundamental value than the property rights of another person.
Or: Heinz should not steal the medicine, because others may need the medicine just
as badly, and their lives are equally significant.
In differentiating the what sort of moral judgements (form and structure) we make
from what moral judgements (content), Kohlberg very reflects the difference between
vMEMES and memes/schemas found in Spiral Dynamics.
Evaluation of the Theory
There have been critiques of the theory from several perspectives.
One criticism of Kohlberg's theory is that it emphasises justice to the exclusion
of other values, and so may not adequately address the arguments of those who value
other moral aspects of actions. Carol Gilligan (1977) Kohlberg’s one-time assistant,
has argued that his theory is overly androcentric. She argued that it did not adequately
describe the concerns of women. Gilligan developed an alternative theory of moral
reasoning based on the ethics of caring. However, research generally has found no
significant pattern of differences in moral development between the sexes. See Gender
Bias for details.
It has been stated by the likes of William Crain (1985) that Kohlberg's stages are
not culturally neutral, as demonstrated by the theory’s application to a number of
different cultures. Although they progress through the stages in the same order,
individuals in different cultures seem to do so at different rates - as evidenced
by Sara Harkness, Carolyn Edwards & Charles Super (1981). Kohlberg himself (1969),
however, had carried out studies in Britain, Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey and Yucatan and
found that the order of stages was consisent across cultures ,though development
tended to be slower in non-industrialised countries. Colby & Kohlberg (1987) reported
that longitudinal studies in Turkey and Israel showed the same thing: consistent
order of stages but different developmental paces. Kohlberg’s (1971) explanation
was to say that, although different cultures do indeed inculcate different beliefs,
his stages correspond to underlying modes of reasoning, rather than to those beliefs.
Kohlberg, with John R Snarey & Joseph Reimer (1985), reviewed 44 studies across 26
cultures and found that people in nearly all cultures go through the stages in the
same order, with little evidence of stage skipping. Where they did find evidence
of Stage 5 reasoning, it was inevitably in urban areas. (Snarey & Kurt Keljo put
forward further evidence in 1991 that Post-Conventional understanding occurs mainly
in more developed, industrialised societies.) In that the stages are experienced
in the same order, regardless of culture, the idea must stand that Kohlberg’s stages
are universal.
Since, in Integrated SocioPsychology, Kohlberg’s stages are seen as the outputs of
vMEMES processing moral issues - and Kohlberg’s assignations of sub-stages supports
this, since the sub-stages can be seen as the results of vMEME transition stages
- then Crain’s criticism is placed in context. Spiral Dynamics holds that vMEMES
emerge in symbiotic relationship to the Life Conditions (whether of the internal
or external environment conditions). So where external Life Conditions vary between
cultures it would be expected that the rate of vMEME emergence and, therefore, moral
reasoning (as an output of vMEME activity) would vary in accordance with the cultural
determinants.
Inevitably, though, the memes dominating in a culture will have an effect on how
vMEMES process moral issues. Joan Miller, David Bersoff & Robin Harwood (1990) found
that in India the moral code tended to emphasise social duties more than individual
rights. This led Miller, Richard A Shweder & Manamohan Mahapatra (1990) to propose
an alternative Post-Conventional Morality in India, based on conceptions of natural
law and justice, rather than individualism and social equality.
However, John Berry, Ype Poortinga, Marshall Segall & Pierre Dasen (1992) found that,
on the really serious moral issues, there was little difference between the Indians
and the Americans in relation to social responsibilities. By adapting Kohlberg’s
theory to include Chinese concepts such as the ‘Golden Mean’ (behaving as most people
in society behave) and ‘Good Will’ (acting in a way that complies with nature), H
K Ma (1988) produced a stage model that appeared to measure moral development amongst
Chinese people.
This symbiotic relationship between the Life Conditions and vMEME emergence and activity
would explain why Kenneth Rubin & Kristin Trotter (1977) found different moral reasoning
over several different dilemmas. Different Life Conditions - even theoretical ones
- require different thinking! R V Burton (1976) attributes inconsistencies in moral
reasoning to situational factors such likelihood of punishment or peer group pressure
- ie: Life Conditions.
Some have put forward the view that there is such an overlap between Kohlberg’s stages
that they should more properly be regarded as separate domains. However, these overlaps
are explained by vMEME Transition Stages. Inevitably, the transition between vMEMES
will display at times the moral reasoning of 2 vMEMES as one fades in influence in
the selfplex and its successor grows in influence.
Part 2
Modifications to the Theory
In Lawrence Kohlberg's empirical studies of individuals throughout their life, he
observed that some had apparently undergone moral stage regression. (Regression was,
in fact, supported by James Rest (1983) who found that 1 in 14 school participants
moved back to an earlier stage.) Faced with the option of either conceding that moral
regression could occur or revising his theory, Kohlberg (1976) chose the latter,
postulating the existence of sub-stages in which the emerging stage has not yet been
fully integrated into the personality. In particular he noted a stage 4.5 or ‘4+’
or ‘4B’, a transition from Stage 4 to Stage 5, that shared characteristics of both.
In this stage the individual is disaffected with the arbitrary nature of law and
order reasoning; culpability is frequently turned from being defined by society to
viewing society itself as culpable. This stage is often mistaken for the moral relativism
of stage two, as the individual views those interests of society which conflict with
their own as being relatively and morally wrong. Kohlberg noted that this was often
observed in students entering college.
Using what effectively was a 9-stage model incorporating 3 sub-stages, Lawrence Walker,
B De Vries & S D Trevethan (1987) found general agreement with Kohlberg. They interviewed
40 boys and 40 girls of various ages. The majority of those aged 6 were between Stages
1 and 2; at age 12 60% were between Stages 2 and 3; by age 15 the majority were at
Stage 3. A further sample of adults was tested (average age: 40). The majority were
between Stages 3 and 4, with 3% between stages 4 and 5. When Walker (1989) retested
the child participants 2 years later, 6% had moved down half a stage, 22% had moved
up and none had skipped a stage.
Kohlberg (1986) suggested that there may be a seventh stage - Transcendental Morality,
or Morality of Cosmic Orientation - which linked religion with moral reasoning. However,
Kohlberg's difficulties in obtaining sufficient empirical evidence for even a 6th
stage - described in his posthumously published work with Anne Colby (1987) - led
him to emphasise the speculative nature of his proposed 7th stage.
Understanding the Theory
According to Kohlberg, cognitive development is a prerequisite for moral development
- though cognitive development is not, of itself, a guarantor of moral development.
Since close on 50% of adults are thought not to have truly moved into Formal Operations
- see Piaget’s 4 Stages of Cognitive Development - it should be nor surprise that
Kohlberg could find few adults capable of Stage 6 moral reasoning and not as many
as he originally predicted of Stage 5.
Against John Santrock’s (1975) finding that a child’s stage of moral reasoning could
not predict whether they would cheat, given the chance, Kohlberg (1975) compared
cheating behaviour amongst students at different levels of moral reasoning. Around
70% of the students at the Pre-Conventional level were found to cheat, compared with
only 15% at the Post-Conventional level. Cheating students at the Conventional level
were intermediate (approximately 55%). Kohlberg’s work here is supported by that
of Eugene Fodor (1972) who found that delinquents tended to operate at lower stages
than non-delinquents.
Yet other psychologists have questioned the assumption that moral action is primarily
a result of formal reasoning. Social intuitionists such as Jonathan Haidt (2001),
for example, argue that individuals often make moral judgments without weighing concerns
such as fairness, law, human rights or abstract ethical values. Thus, the arguments
analysed by Kohlberg and other rationalist psychologists could be considered post
hoc rationalisations of intuitive decisions; moral reasoning may be less relevant
to moral action than Kohlberg's theory suggests. This argument simply reflects the
fact that each vMEME has own natural sense of what is right and wrong - bearing in
mind which memes it has been exposed to. Moreover, somebody high in the Psychoticism
Dimension of Temperament would be far less likely to think about a situation - being
far more likely to act impulsively.
Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development has been utilised by others working in the
field. One example is the Defining Issues Test (DIT) created in 1979 by James Rest,
originally as a pencil-and-paper alternative to the Moral Judgement Interview. Heavily
influenced by the 6-stage model, it made efforts to improve the validity criteria
by using a quantitative test, the Likert Scale, to rate moral dilemmas similar to
Kohlberg's. It also used a large body of Kohlbergian theory, such as the idea of
‘post-conventional thinking’. In 1999 the DIT was revised as the DIT-2; the test
continues to be used in many areas where moral
testing is required, such as divinity, politics and medicine.
According to a study of the most eminent psychologists of the 20th Century by Steven
Haggbloom, Renee Warnick, Jason Warnick, Vinessa K Jones, Gary Yarbrough, Tinea Russell,
Chris Borecky, Reagan McGahhey, John Powell, Jamie Beavers & Emmanuelle Monte, Kohlberg
was the 16th most frequently cited psychologist in introductory textbooks throughout
the century, as well as the 30th most eminent overall.
