Correspondent Inference Theory is a psychological theory proposed by Edward E Jones
& Keith Davis (1965) that argues we use the consequences of a person's behaviour
as a basis for inferring the person's intentions. For example, if you observe someone
striking another person Correspondent Inference Theory suggests that you are likely
to assume that the attacker is motivated by a desire to inflict harm (because harm
is the perceived consequence of the action). We may also infer something about that
person’s character - eg: the attacker is aggressive person.
However, the attacker may not have been acting maliciously (e.g., the attacker may
have been play-acting, or acting in defence). Thus, the theory suggests that intention
is inferred from the most easily-observable consequences of a person's actions.
Attributing
Intention
The problem of accurately defining intentions is a difficult one. For every observed
act, there are a multitude of possible motivations. If a person buys someone a drink
in the pub, he may be trying to curry favour, his friend may have bought him a drink
earlier, or he may be doing a favour for a friend with no cash.
It should be noted that the work done by Jones & Davis only deals with how people
make attributions to the person; they do not deal with how people make attributions
about situational or external causes.
Jones & Davis make the reasonable assumption that, in order to infer that any effects
of an action were intended, the perceiver must believe that:-
- the actor knew the consequences of the actions - eg: the technician who pushed that
button at Chernobyl did not intend the reactor to melt down
- the actor had the ability to perform the action – eg: could Lee Harvey Oswald really
have shot John F Kennedy?).
Non-Common
Effects
The consequences of a chosen action must be compared with the consequences of possible
alternative actions. The fewer effects the possible choices have in common, the more
confident one can be in inferring a correspondent disposition. Or, put another way,
the more distinctive the consequences of a choice, the more confidently you can infer
intention and disposition.
Suppose, for example, you are planning to go on a postgraduate course, and you short-list
two colleges - University College London and the London School of Economics. You
choose UCL rather than the LSE. What can the social perceiver learn from this? First
there are a lot of common effects - urban environment, same distance from home, same
exam system, similar academic reputation, etc. These common effects do not provide
the perceiver with any clues about your motivation. But if the perceiver believes
that UCL has better sports facilities, or easier access to the University Library
then these non-common or unique effects which can provide a clue to your motivation.
But, suppose you had short-listed UCL and University of Essex and you choose UCL.
Now the perceiver is faced with a number of non-common effects – eg: size of city,
distance from home, academic reputation, exam system. The perceiver would then be
much less confident about inferring a particular intention or disposition when there
are a lot of non-common effects. The fewer the non-common effects, the more certain
the attribution of intent.
Low
Social Desirability
People usually intend socially desirable outcomes; hence, socially desirable outcomes
are not informative about a person's intention or disposition. The most that you
can infer is that the person is normal - which is not saying anything very much.
But socially undesirable actions are more informative about intentions & dispositions.
Suppose you asked a friend for a loan of £1 and it was given (a socially desirable
action) - the perceiver couldn't say a great deal about your friend's kindness or
helpfulness because most people would have done the same thing. If, on the other
hand, the friend refused to lend you the money (a socially undesirable action), the
perceiver might well feel that your friend is rather stingy, or even miserly.
In fact, social desirability - although an important influence on behaviour - is
really only a special case of the more general principle that behaviour which deviates
from the normal, usual, or expected is more informative about a person's disposition
than behaviour that conforms to the normal, usual, or expected. So, for example,
when people do not conform to group pressure we can be more certain that they truly
believe the views they express than people who conform to the group. Similarly, when
people in a particular social role (e.g. doctor, teacher, salesperson, etc) behave
in ways that are not in keeping with the role demands, we can be more certain about
what they are really like than when people behave in role.
Expectancies
Only behaviours that disconfirm expectancies are truly informative about an actor.
There are two types of expectancy. Category-based expectancies are those derived
from our knowledge about particular types or groups of people. For example, if you
were surprised to hear a wealthy businessman extolling the virtues of Socialism,
your surprise would rest on the expectation that businessmen (a category of people)
are not usually socialist.
Target-based expectancies derive from knowledge about a particular person. To know
that a person is a supporter of Margaret Thatcher sets up certain expectations and
associations about their beliefs and character.
Choice
Another factor in inferring a disposition from an action is whether the behaviour
of the actor is constrained by situational forces or whether it occurs from the actor's
choice. If you were assigned to argue a position in a classroom debate (eg: for or
against the free-market economy), it would be unwise of your audience to infer that
your statements in the debate reflect your true beliefs - because you did not choose
to argue that particular side of the issue. If, however, you had chosen to argue
one side of the issue, then it would be appropriate for the audience to conclude
that your statements reflect your true beliefs.
Although choice ought to have an important effect on whether or not people make correspondent
inferences, research shows that people do not take choice sufficiently into account
when judging another person's attributes or attitudes. There is a tendency for perceivers
to assume that when an actor engages in an activity, such as stating a point of view
or attitude, the statements made are indicative of the actor's true beliefs, even
when there may be clear situational forces affecting the behaviour. In fact, earlier,
psychologists had foreseen that something like this would occur; they thought that
the actor-act relation was so strong - like a perceptual Gestalt - that people would
tend to over-attribute actions to the actor even when there are powerful external
forces on the actor that could account for the behaviour.
Criticisms
Correspondent Inference Theory does not take into account how in-group/out-group
factors can influence inference.
Roos Vonk & Dorien Konst (1998) read out descriptions of either socially acceptable
or unacceptable behaviour by a colleague to a 149 employees in an organisation. The
descriptions were accompanied by information to suggest that the behaviour was either
dispositional or situational in origin. Vonk & Konst found that when the person committing
the behaviour was an in-group member, participants were more likely to make situational
attributions for socially unacceptable behaviour and dispositional attributions for
more positive behaviours. The opposite effects were found for out-group members.
Jane Workman & Elizabeth Freeburg (1999) found that gender could lead to a very powerful
in group/out-group effect. They read 638 students a story involving date rape, showed
them photographs of the victim and asked the students to attribute responsibility
to the victim, the perpetrator or the situation. Males were significantly more likely
to attribute responsibility to the victim while females were more likely to blame
the perpetrator.
The theory may also be vulnerable to cultural bias. Valerie Stander, Ping-Chuan Hsiung
& Shelley MacDermid (2001) compared the attributions made by American and Chinese
husbands and wives towards each other. The Chinese couples were found to make more
dispositional attributions for positive behaviour and more situational attributions
for negative behaviour than did the Americans. However, it is difficult to know,
from a single study whether this favourable attribution style, is specific to marital
relationships or is more reflective of Chinese culture in general.
Developed initially from Wikipedia articles under the GNU Free Documentation Licence.
